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Why Responsible Innovation? 
René von Schomberg1 
Below I will provide a bird’s eye view on six deficits in the global research and innovations 
system that constitute obstacles for innovations delivering on societal desirable objectives, 
describing how we got where we are and pointing the way forward. I will first give a short 
historical account of the progress we have achieved in the governance of the risks of emerging 
technologies, then highlight six departure points for a vision of responsible innovation based 
upon reflections on the six deficits in the research and innovation system 
Nuclear power plants were regularly erected during the 1950s and 1960s with very little 
interference from our democratic institutions (contracts with nuclear technology operators 
were not made accessible with a view to protection of intellectual property rights). This 
occurred in absence of professional risk governance and management, and in a culture of 
technological optimism: it was not until the early 1970s, decades after the introduction of civil 
nuclear technology, that it was acknowledged that there were no solutions for the storage of 
nuclear waste. The institutionalisation of risk identification and analysis as a distinct 
professional activity, executed by professionals who were not themselves part of the 
development of technology, and therefore unbiased, emerged only at the end of the 1960s 
(Evers, Nowotny 1987).  
The governance and introduction of subsequent emerging technologies became gradually 
more comprehensive, however, with most progress achieved in the area of risk governance. In 
Europe, regulations and directives were put in place prior to the introduction of genetically 
modified organisms in the 1990s, as well as for particular food products involving 
nanotechnology. The learning process in defining and managing risks also took account of an 
ever-evolving public debate, not in the least, and prominently, during responses to crisis. In 
Europe, the BSE (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy) and other food crises brought about a 
major overhaul of risk governing and management mechanisms and led to changes in several 
areas, including: 
  how scientific advice was made,  
the choice of the composition of scientific advisory bodies,  
the transparency of the decision-process and  
the adoption of the precautionary principle in the policy making process as part of the 
broader issue of European Governance. (Commission of the European Communities, 
2001). 
The diagnosis from the European Commission at that time was:  
The advent of bio-technologies are highlighting the unprecedented moral and ethical 
issues thrown up by technology. This underlines the need for a wide range of 
disciplines and experience beyond the purely scientific  
Recent food crises have highlighted the importance of informing people and policy 
makers about what is known and where uncertainty persists. But they have also 
undermined public confidence in expert-based policy-making. Public perceptions are 
not helped by the opacity of the Union’s system of expert committees or the lack of 
information about how they work. It is often unclear who is actually deciding - experts 
or those with political authority. At the same time, a better-informed public 
increasingly questions the content and independence of the expert advice that is given” 
(page 18).  
 
The formation of public opinion on new technologies is not a historically or geographically 
isolated process; rather, it is inevitably linked to prior (national and international) debate on 
similar topics. Ideally, such debates should enable a learning process – one that allows for the 
fact that public opinion forms within particular cultures and political systems. It is therefore 
not surprising that, for example in the case of nanotechnologies, the nature of public debate 
and its role in the policy making process is articulated against a background of previous 
discussion of the introduction of new technologies, or that specific national experiences with 
those technologies become important. In particular, the introduction of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) into the environment is an important reference point within Europe (but 
frequently absent in such debates in the USA). This historical development of policy 
frameworks can be followed through the ways in which terms are used and defined: initially, 
definitions are often determined by the use of analogies that, in the initial stages of the policy 
process, serve to ‘normalise’ new phenomena. In a number of countries, for instance, GMOs 
were initially regulated through laws that deal with toxic substances. Subsequently such 
analogies tend to lose their force as scientific insight into technology grows and distinct 
regulatory responses can be made. GMOs, for example, eventually became internationally 
defined as ‘potentially hazardous’, with a case by case approach adopted in the European 
Union under new forms of precautionary regulation. This framework was developed over a 
period of decades, and thereby considered the ever-widening realm in which GMOs could 
have effect (developing from an exclusive focus on direct effects to eventually include 
indirect and long-term effects). It is not, however, solely the scientific validity of analogies 
that determines definitions and policy: public interest also plays an important role. Carbon 
dioxide, for instance, has changed from being viewed as a gas essential to life on earth to 
being viewed as a ‘pollutant’. (This latest iteration of this evolution came just prior to the 
Copenhagen summit on climate change in December 2009, when the US Environmental 
Protection Agency defined greenhouse gases as a “threat to public health” – a definition that 
has important implications for future policy measures, despite having been downplayed again 
during the Trump administration). 
In the case of nanotechnology policy, it seems likely that we are still in the early phases of 
development. Nanoparticles continue to be defined as “chemical substances” under the 
European regulatory framework REACH. (Analogies are also made with asbestos, as a way to 
grasp hold of possible environmental and human health effects, but these are contested. There 
is no certainty that they will become the definitive way to frame risk assessments). 
Nanotechnology in food did not start its public and policy life with a historically blank canvas 
but has been defined as a ‘novel food’ under the European Union Novel Foods regulation, 
which came into existence for the regulation of foods containing GMOs. 
First Deficit: Exclusive focus on risk and safety issues concerning new technologies 
under governmental regulations 
Although the progress in policy frameworks and mechanisms for risk management and 
governance may look impressive, it came along with an unchanged scope of the responsibility 
of democratic states for emerging technologies. The so-called market hurdles for product 
authorisations define state responsibilities in terms of safety, quality or efficacy of products. 
In some specific situations, such as with pharmaceutical products, this may be extended to 
cost-effectiveness considerations. However, the focus on product-authorisation and the main 
three aspects noted above involves a technology-neutral approach and an exclusive focus on 
the safety and quality features of products. The state takes responsibility for the risks of 
products derived from new technologies, while the benefits are delegated to the ‘market’ and 
defined in terms of success within the market. This sharply contrasts with technology-specific 
research and innovation funding whereby emerging technologies are stimulated with a view to 
increase the innovation capacity and competitiveness on the one hand and public debate often 
focussed on the (non-)social desirability of particular outcomes of those technologies beyond 
their technical risks on the other. Whereas public debates on the societal desirability of 
outcomes do not have a specific entry point in governmental policy making, specific 
economic considerations drive the public and private funding of research and innovation 
actions. A first departure point for a vision of responsible innovation is therefore to advance 
governance mechanisms that could drive innovations to societally desirable ends. In other 
words, instead of an exclusive focus on the risks of new technologies, the question of 
directing or redirecting research and innovation towards societally desirable ends has to be 
given importance in research and innovation programmes. This implies that we not only have 
to have professional bodies for risk assessment but also professional bodies that should look 
into the type of outcomes we want to get out of research and innovation processes, and the 
establishment of governance mechanisms that should give some direction to –- or steer –- the 
innovation process. I will make a proposal related to this issue in the final section of this 
chapter on the sixth deficit. 
Second Deficit: Market deficits in delivering on societal desirable innovations 
Innovations often overwhelm people, and virtually no new transformative technological 
innovations have been predicted in advance. Even at the early stage of technology 
development, such as in the case of nanotechnology, the first marketed products were not of 
the kind experts initially predicted. The first products involving nanotechnology were 
cosmetics, despite expectations centring on healthcare and environmentally sound 
applications. Although new technologies are generally hyped in their beginning phases, with 
high expectations on outcomes (such as ‘nanobots’ that are capable of cleaning our arteries), 
alongside economic benefits, the reality kicks in with disappointing products such as nano 
socks that you don’t need to wash for a couple of weeks or teddy bears for children that 
remain equally hygienic for long term use.  
There seems to be a general mis-match between the pace of ‘new’ products entering the 
market and the societal significance of those products. Notably in areas where our innovation 
system relies on a handful of multinational companies such in the medical and agrobusiness 
fields, innovations are not delivering on societal expectations. In the pharmaceutical field, the 
economic rationale results in counter intuitive research and innovation priorities in the private 
sector: medicines that can treat rather than cure chronic diseases are preferable from an 
economic point of view. Malaria, the disease that infects the most victims worldwide, is 
under-investigated, since the introduction to the market of medicines for the treatment of 
diseases in top-income countries is economically more beneficial. For Malaria, to a significant 
extent we rely on the input of philanthropy, such as the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation, 
which invests more in combatting Malaria than any other public body in a context where drug 
makers have abandoned the field. But even high-income countries such as the Netherlands are 
not free from unwanted market- impacts: the country suffers from increasing shortages of 
medicine supply as drug makers consider it to be a too small market with relative low drugs 
prices. 
Jack Stilgoe (2014) reported in the Guardian that “only 10% of the world’s health research 
funding goes to 90% of the world’s disease burden. Thomson Reuters found that the disparity 
is even more stark when we consider published research. The number of papers on 
elephantiasis and intestinal worms, which together affect more than a billion people, is less 
than a tenth of the figure for diabetes and HIV/AIDS.”. 
The international regime for Intellectual Property Rights is at the heart of inhibiting 
responsible innovation. The Nobel Prize winner Stieglitz made the following diagnosis of the 
system in a co-authored recent report: 
Nowadays, it is widely recognized that the management of innovation in countries like 
the US has been sub-optimal and led to a situation that is increasingly litigious and 
plagued by conflicts. In fields such as information technology, a whole set of weak 
patents and an epidemic of over-patenting has made subsequent innovation difficult 
and has eroded some of the gains from knowledge creation (see Bessen and Meurer, 
2008 among others). Moreover, in some areas, such as in pharmaceuticals, ever-
stronger IP protections has not necessarily led to an increase in the discovery of new 
chemical entities (see Dosi and Stiglitz, 2014). Rather, the demands and needs of 
different industries become more opposed, leading to serious concerns for policy 
makers. There is a shrinking of the knowledge commons as even publicly funded and 
promoted innovation is privatized, thereby reducing both equity and efficiency (Baker 
et al., 2017). 
Although market-innovations are very effective when they concern efficiency gains as they 
immediately reflect an economic rationale that honours better outcomes for lower costs, we 
cannot expect innovations to come equally quickly to the market when they require 
transformative changes, such as a change of infrastructure, which will not come about without 
heavy public investment. A second departure point for a vision of responsible innovation is 
therefore to compensate for existing market deficits and allocate new governance roles for 
public bodies and stakeholders. The deficit of markets is immediately linked to a further 
articulation of this deficit: the non-alignment of innovations with broadly shared public values 
in specific innovation contexts where transformative change has become societally desirable, 
virtually across all topics touching on sustainable development and / or issues that are 
dependent on a knowledge commons. 
 
Third deficit: Aligning innovation with broadly shared public values and expectations 
Under the European Framework programme for Research and Innovation Horizon 2020, a 
number of ‘Grand Societal Challenges’ have been defined, which followed the call in the 
Lund Declaration for a Europe that ‘must focus on the Grand Societal Challenges of our time’ 
(Lund Declaration 2009 during the Swedish EU presidency). Sustainable solutions are sought 
in areas such as “global warming, tightening supplies of energy, water and food, ageing 
societies, public health, pandemics and security (ibid, p.1). 
Arguably, the Grand Societal Challenges of our time reflect a number of normative anchor 
points of the Treaty in relation to the ‘promotion of scientific and technological advance’ and 
which thus can be seen as legitimate. However, the promotion of scientific and technological 
advance has until now served as a goal in itself. The promotion of scientific and technological 
advance has not been coupled to other, all interrelated, normative anchor points such as 
‘ensuring a high level of protection’ that, ‘sustainable development’, ‘competitive social 
market economy’ that drive all other EU policies. It does not require much political initiative 
to couple the promotion of scientific and technological advance with all other major 
normative anchor points in the EU treaty to give a broader base for the justification of 
research and innovation beyond assumed economic benefits and increase of competitiveness. 
The Lund Declaration states that in order to be responsive the European Research Area must 
develop ‘processes for the identification of Grand Societal Challenges, which gain political 
support and gradually move away from the current thematic approaches, towards a structure 
where research priorities are based on these Grand Societal Challenges’. It hopes to give 
direction to research and innovation in the form of ‘broad areas of issue-oriented research in 
relevant fields’ (ibid, p.1). It calls for (amongst other things), broad stakeholder involvement 
and the establishment of public-private partnerships. 
 
The macro-economic justification for investment in research and innovation emphasizes that 
innovation is the “only answer” to tackle societal challenges: “Returning to growth and higher 
levels of employment, combating climate change and moving towards a low-carbon society” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2011, p. 3). This approach implicitly assumes 
that access to and availability of finance for research and innovation will automatically lead to 
the creations of jobs and economic growth, thereby taking on the societal challenges along the 
way. The more innovation, the better. The faster it becomes available, the better. In this 
macro-economic model, innovation is assumed to be rudderless but inherently good, since it 
produces prosperity and jobs and meets societal challenges addressed through market-
demand. 
 
The Lund Declaration gives, however, an alternative justification for investing in research and 
innovation, primarily framing this in terms of responding to societal Grand Societal 
Challenges and further stating that “meeting the Grand Societal Challenges will be a 
prerequisite for continued economic growth and for improved chances to tackle key issues” 
(Lund Declaration 2009, p.2). Here, the assumption is that sustainable economic growth is 
only possible when particular societal objectives are met, in the form of responding to Grand 
Societal Challenges. Innovation is neither seen as rudderless nor as inherently good. 
Economic prosperity and the anticipation that innovation yields positive anticipated impacts 
(such as the creation of jobs and growth) become dependent upon the social context. The 
Lund Declaration points out that measures are “needed to maximize the economic and 
societal impact of new knowledge” (ibid., p.2; italics by the author). The idea is clear; to steer 
the innovation process towards socially beneficial objectives.  
 
Additional measures that go beyond removing barriers for research and innovation such as the 
availability of and access to finance for research and innovation then become necessary. The 
Lund Declaration defines a type of justification of investment in research and innovation 
towards particular positive outcomes. The Lund Declaration underlines a justification of 
research and innovation beyond economic terms. The question on how to define positive 
outcomes or “the right impacts” of innovation can be found in the normative anchor points in 
basic treaties and constitutions. This also brings an advantage for democratic governance: 
organisations and citizen can claim the proper implementation of policies by articulating the 
meaning of these anchor points in concrete situations. This enabled for example, the citizen 
organisation Urgenda in the Netherlands to sue the state for negligence in court for not taking 
appropriate measures for combatting climate change. The Court of Appeal based its ruling on 
the State’s legal duty to ensure the protection of the lives and family life of citizens, also in 
the long term. This legal duty is enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), (Urgenda, 2018).  
 
The third departure point for a vision of Responsible innovation marks the paradigm shift 
from a justification in purely macro-economic terms of publicly funded research and 
innovation towards a justification of the purpose and direction of innovation in terms of 
broadly shared pubic values. 
Fourth deficit: A focus on the responsible development of technology and technological 
potentials rather than on responsible innovation. 
The institutional and societal learning processes brought by the introduction of new 
technologies since World War II have culminated in specific large-scale initiatives to promote 
the “responsible development” of new technologies under public policy. Nanoscience and 
nanotechnologies constitute the first historic case in which a technology, in its infancy, is 
being addressed by such large-scale, multi-billion dollar/euro, mid- to long-term programmes 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Since 2001, The National Nanotechnology Initiative (2001) has 
been the U.S. Federal Government’s interagency programme for coordinating research and 
development and enhancing communication and collaborative activities in nanoscale science, 
engineering, and technology. Support for “responsible development of nanotechnology” 
features among its major goals (National Nanotechnology Initiative 2001). The European 
Commission also adopted a European strategy and action plan that emphasized the 
‘integrated, safe, and responsible’ development of nanosciences and nanotechnologies 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2009, p.10. The ’responsible development of 
nanotechnology’ was under both the American and the European initiative addressed by: 
● Identification and management of ethical, legal, and societal implications 
● Incorporation of safety evaluation of nanomaterial into the product life cycle and 
allocation of budgets for identification and study of risks 
● Identification of knowledge gaps and regulatory needs 
● Involvement of stakeholders and engagement in international dialogue 
Reflections on an appropriate governance framework for the responsible development of 
technologies have led to the call for specific requirements of such a governance process, 
which shift the focus to the innovation process as such and disconnects from the prior sole 
focus on exploring technological potential: 
● Anticipatory governance: An adequate governance framework should anticipate the 
intended and unintended impacts of new technologies in economic, environmental, 
social, and ethical terms. This requires extensive use of technology foresight and 
technology assessment (Karinen/Guston, 2010). 
● Deliberative governance: This implies inclusive governance, one based on broad 
stakeholder involvement and early public intervention in research and development 
leading to responsive public policies (Owen et al. 2013) or even a required commitment 
of stakeholders with a view on particular socially desirable outcomes (Von Schomberg 
2013). 
● An ethics of co-responsibility: The outcomes of research and innovation are the result of 
institutional and collective actions which often lead to consequences which can hardly be 
traced back to the actions or intentions of any individual. Societal actors and innovators 
have to assume shared responsibility for both the intended and unintended outcomes 
(Von Schomberg 2007). 
● The systematic use of normative principles for the design of technologies. Ethics 
becomes a driving force for innovation rather than a constraint. “Privacy by Design” is 
the most prominent example of such a normative principle, and Stahl (2011) and others 
have used this and other principles for devising a responsible governance of information 
and communication technology (ICT). 
● Whenever appropriate, the integration of social science and humanities within 
interdisciplinary research practices to increase reflexivity (Fisher et al. 2006). 
However, responsible innovation has been articulated not only with a view on the anticipation 
and good management of possible risks of new technologies and their technological potential 
but also with a view on the ‘right impacts of research and innovation’. In other words: what 
do we want to get out of (publicly) funded research and innovation? In the European Union 
this has been articulated by a call to direct research and innovation towards the Grand Societal 
Challenges of our times: climate change, food security, ageing populations, etc. Even more 
broadly formulated, responsible innovation can be seen to be responsive to basic public values 
or benefits for humanity (Ozolina et al. 2012) or fundamental rights or the constitutional 
normative anchor points I outlined above, thus driving innovations towards socially desirable 
outcomes. 
 
I have proposed the following definition consistent with an ambitious vision of innovation 
governance: 
‘Responsible innovation’ is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors 
and innovators become mutually responsive to each other regarding the ethical 
acceptability, sustainability and social desirability of the innovation process and its 
marketable products (Von Schomberg 2013, p.63). 
‘Responsible research and innovation’ shift the focus from research and development of 
particular technologies and/or particular risks towards the whole innovation process, and 
its governance which is neither technology-specific, nor solely risk-focused’ (ibid., p. 
63). 
Some European Innovation Partnerships, for instance the partnership on ‘Healthy Ageing’, 
implicitly seem to practise responsible innovation to the extent that a socially desirable 
objective (in this case, the increase of life-expectancy by 2 years in 2020) is pursued with 
multi-optional technological means, as well as by means of social innovation, having public 
and private bodies committed to overall-normative objectives within flexible and adaptable 
research and innovation trajectories. 
 
A fourth departure point for a vision of responsible innovation marks thus the shift from an 
exclusive focus on the development of technologies and their technological potential to the 
outcomes and management of an innovation process with a view to align innovation with 
broadly shared public values and expectations. In the context of responsible innovation, the 
setting of societal objectives takes precedence over the maximisation of the technological 
potential. 
 
Fifth deficit: A lack of Open research systems and open scholarship as a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition for responsible innovation 
Open research and scholarship gradually evolved from two global trends: Open Access to 
research outputs and Open Source. The former refers to online, peer-reviewed scholarly 
outputs, which are free to read, with limited or no copyright and licensing restrictions, while 
Open Source refers to software co-created without any proprietary restriction and which can 
be accessed and used.  
The Budapest Open Access Initiative of 2002 established Open Access for the first time as an 
internationally desirable publishing practice. Although Open Access became primarily 
associated with a particular publishing or scientific dissemination practice, the Budapest Open 
Access Initiative already sought to induce a broader practice of open scholarship that includes 
the general re-use of all kinds of research products, not just publications or data. But it is only 
more recently that various forms of open scholarship have evolved to the concept of a 
transformed scientific practice, shifting the focus of researchers’ activity from ‘publishing as 
fast as possible’ to ‘sharing knowledge as early as possible’.  
Michael Nielsen’s book ‘Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Science’ is 
arguably the first and most comprehensive coverage of Open Scholarship accessible to a 
broad readership. Michael Nielsen advocated Open Science as ‘the idea that scientific 
knowledge of all kinds should be openly shared as early as is practical in the discovery 
process’. 
The ecosystem underpinning open scholarship is evolving very rapidly. Social network 
platforms for researchers, such as Research Gate or Academia already attract many millions 
of users and are being used to begin and validate more research projects in a brain-sourced 
way. Open scholarship is extended to open forms of using code, scientific discovery and 
analysis, open research assessment and review, as well as outreach.  
Open scholarship is predominantly the result of a bottom-up process driven by a growing 
number of researchers, who increasingly employ social media and a variety of digital means 
for their research to initiate globally coordinated research projects and share results at an early 
stage in the research process, for example through electronic notebooks that allow for real-
time global sharing of ‘raw’ research data among collaborating partners and facilitate access 
to results for potential collaborators. 
An early and well-known example of open scholarship from the pre-internet stage is the 
Human Genome Project that started in 1990. The data on the human genome was widely 
shared among the scientific community in the course of the project, while at the same time a 
moratorium on publishing was kept in order to encourage optimal collaboration. Because of 
this openness, they were able to decode the human genome in less than 15 years. Open 
scholarship has shifted the prime focus of researchers away from publishing towards 
knowledge sharing. 
The ongoing changes are progressively transforming scientific practices and innovative tools 
to facilitate communication, collaboration, and data analysis are appearing. Researchers 
increasingly work together to create knowledge. Online tools create a shared space where 
creative conversation can be scaled up. As a result, the problem-solving process can be faster 
and the range of problems that can be solved can be expanded (Nielsen 2012). 
Fuelled by the new opportunities for knowledge and data-sharing, more open practices have 
emerged to address pressing issues at an early stage. For example, five months into the largest 
Ebola outbreak in history, an international group of researchers sequenced three viral 
genomes, sampled from patients in Guinea. The data was made public that same month This 
open scientific practice was extended into making experimental vaccine available within a 
short period and proved vital in combatting relatively smaller outbreaks in 2018. The National 
Institutes of Health in the United States now require grantees to make large scale genomic 
data public by the time of publication at the latest. The World Health Organisation (WHO, 
2015) seeks a paradigm shift in the approach to information sharing in public health 
emergencies, from one limited by embargoes set for publication timelines, to open sharing 
using modern fit-for-purpose pre-publication platforms. Researchers, journals and funders 
will need to engage fully for this paradigm shift to occur. The WHO acknowledged that 
patents on natural genome sequences could be inhibitory for further research and product 
development and wants research entities to exercise discretion in patenting and licensing 
genome-related inventions so as not to inhibit product development and to ensure appropriate 
benefit sharing. The organisation also wants scientific publishers not to penalize, but to 
encourage or mandate public sharing of relevant data. Zikka was the next major emerging 
public health issue that was tackled with effective initiatives based on open scholarship. 
The way the WHO dealt with these public health issues and the associated commendable 
initiatives of researchers who obviously felt a moral obligation to engage in open scholarship 
practices with a view on the urgency of the matter deserve to become a model for scientific 
practice as such. However, this practice is currently more an exception than the rule. 
Reproducibility and productivity crises in science 
Open scholarship strongly contrasts with mainstream science, which has become too 
competitive in nature and often mandated by major industries. This has led to the serious 
situation that ‘Science goes wrong’. The magazine the Economist noted in a lead article of 
October 2013:  
Too many of the findings that fill the academic ether are the result of shoddy experiments 
or poor analysis. A rule of thumb among biotechnology venture-capitalists is that half of 
published research cannot be replicated. Even that may be optimistic. Last year 
researchers at one biotech firm, Amgen, found they could reproduce just six of 53 
“landmark” studies in cancer research. Earlier, a group at Bayer, a drug company, 
managed to repeat just a quarter of 67 similarly important papers. A leading computer 
scientist frets that three-quarters of papers in his subfield are bunk. In 2000-10 roughly 
80,000 patients took part in clinical trials based on research that was later retracted 
because of mistakes or improprieties. 
Competitive science operates in a closed context whereby researchers and innovators 
anxiously seek to protect research results and intellectual property rights. It is from this point 
of view not surprising that research data that are published or produced in the context of 
clinical trials are not reliable. Science only goes ‘well’ when scientists rigorously verify their 
data with often painful repetitions of research efforts for which there is neither time nor 
willingness to share data with other colleagues in the context of competitive science. 
Nature (May, 26, 2016) asked 1,576 scientists for their thoughts on reproducibility. Most 
agree that there's a ‘reproducibility crisis' and over 70% said they'd tried and failed to 
reproduce another group's experiments. This crisis is certainly not only due to the 
competitiveness of science as such, yet it constitutes a problematic constellation with other 
‘methodological factors such a publication bias towards statistically significant results or the 
very context dependent use of samples in research’. Manufo et al (2017) offer a 
comprehensive overview. 
 
Research productivity of scientists is most often measured by bibliometric means. The (ab)use 
of journal impact factors is at the heart of the dispute here. It is a measure reflecting the 
average number of citations to articles published in an academic journal over a period. It is 
used as a proxy for the relative importance of a journal and as a surrogate for scientific 
quality, with articles in high impact journals considered to be of high quality regardless of 
how many citations they receive individually. Numerous criticisms have been made of 
citation-based metrics, especially when (mis)used to assess the performance of individual 
researchers: often they are not applicable at the individual level; they do not take into account 
the broader social and economic function of scientific research; they are not adapted to the 
increased scale of research; and they cannot recognize new types of work that researchers 
need to perform. The practice persists even though even prominent researchers, e.g. Nobel 
Prize winners have turned their back to this de-railed form of rewarding scientific outputs 
(Nobel Prize winner Randy Schekman called for a boycott of journals with high impact 
factors like Science, Nature and Cell in December 2013).  
The most important element here may not be the inappropriate way of ‘measuring’ quality, 
but the incentives it creates for scientists to become ‘productive’ by producing as many papers 
as possible and engaging in a time-consuming article submission process with a high risk for 
rejection. Nature (editorial lead of December 2006) reported that  
Nature receives approximately 10,000 papers every year and our editors reject about 60% 
of them without review. (Since the journal's launch in 1869, Nature's editors have been 
the only arbiters of what it publishes.) The papers that survive beyond that initial 
threshold of editorial interest are submitted to our traditional process of assessment, in 
which two or more referees chosen by the editors are asked to comment anonymously 
and confidentially. Editors then consider the comments and proceed with rejection, 
encouragement or acceptance. In the end we publish about 7% of our submissions.  
The reproducibility crisis comes together with a ‘productivity’ crisis equally linked to an 
increasingly competitive closed science. Research efforts have increased exponentially during 
decades whereas research productivity has dropped dramatically. Bloom et al (2017) found 
that ‘since the1930s, research effort has risen by a factor of 23 — an average growth rate of 
4.3 percent per year’. However, research productivity has fallen: ‘by a factor of 41 (or at an 
average growth rate of -5.1 percent per year’) (Bloom et al, 2017, page 7). The authors 
generated robust findings that research productivity is falling sharply everywhere they looked 
(agriculture, medicines etc) despite an exponential increase of research efforts. ‘Taking the 
U.S. aggregate number as representative, research productivity falls in half every 13 years — 
ideas are getting harder and harder to find. Put differently, just to sustain constant growth in 
GDP per person, the U.S. must double the amount of research effort searching for new ideas 
every 13 years to offset the increased difficulty of finding new ideas’ (Bloom et al, 2017207, 
p.46) 
The decline in pharmaceutical Research and Development efficiency is dramatic: The number 
of drugs approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) per US dollars(inflation-
adjusted) spent on R&D has halved roughly every 9 years since 1950 (Bountra et al, 2017).  
There are multiple factors responsible for the decline in productivity. However, the 
consequences of careerism in science may well play a role here. The incentives for scientists 
to make a career lie predominantly in the publication of research papers in high-impact 
journals. These journals are biased towards articles that raise interest in the research 
community itself rather than contributing to, for example, the actual improvement of 
treatment of patients (this concerns the cited 60 percent rejection rate of without review, 
which concerns the editorial interests in the subject matter rather than scientific quality or 
relevance). 
For scientists, publishing activities take precedence over delivering on societal relevance, and 
science has become self-referential: Science is assessed based on excellence, a criterion on 
which only scientists themselves decide, and used as an effective argument to keep societal 
interests out of the equation in defense of the ‘autonomy’ of science and their institutions 
(Holbrook, 2017). ‘Excellence’ driven science is funded under very competitive funding 
systems and scientists spend a large amount of their time on submitting proposals for doing 
‘excellent’ research rather than executing research. Johan Bollen (2018) rightly noted that the 
European University Association in 2016 estimated that the equivalent of at least one-quarter 
of Europe’s Horizon 2020 funding programme goes to preparing grant applications (see 
go.nature.com/2vx3mjx). A 2013 study estimated that Australian scientists collectively spent 
more than five centuries of time preparing 3,727 proposals in 2012 (Herbert et al, 2013). 
What would happen if all these scientists instead of spending the (centuries!) of time of 
competing for grants, openly collaborated on research topics of common societal interest? 
Johan Bollen (2018) developed a Self-Organizing Funding Allocation system that would do 
away with all these time-consuming submissions for research grants and would guarantee 
research professors a basic research budget, which could be increased or decreased by 
anonymous donations to other research professors whose research they find worthy of 
support. Simulations of his model showed that the total costs for the alternative funding would 
remain the same if each research professor were allocated 160 000 Euro; yet, obviously, 
research efforts and the productivity of the scientific system would benefit dramatically. Early 
2018, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research held a workshop to plan a pilot 
test with this alternative funding system, after the Dutch Parliament directed it to explore 
alternative modes of funding. This alternative may need some fine-tuning, but it demonstrates 
how the current competitive funding systems contributes to an unproductive scientific system. 
The current rewards and incentives system for scientist and the associated use of metrics 
chase researchers on their ‘research productivity’. This results in a paradox of scientific 
productivity. The more individual scientists become productive (in terms of the current 
system), the less productive the scientific system becomes in terms of delivering on societally 
relevant and desirable outputs. 
The rationale of open research and scholarship 
It is clear that the current reputation and evaluation system has to adapt to the new dynamics 
of open scholarship and acknowledge and incentivise engagement with open research 
activities. The rationale has to shift from publishing as fast as possible to sharing knowledge 
as early as possible. Researchers have growing expectations that their work, including 
intermediate products such as research data, will be better rewarded or considered in their 
career development. In the light of an ever more data-intensive science whereby scientific 
progress is dependent on effective data sharing for the completion of scientific missions, the 
primary focus on publishing articles seems antiquated. Excellent science is also seldom a 
matter of individual intellectual superiority rewarded by competitive funding systems, but 
increasingly more a matter of excellent collaboration among a great number of scientists. The 
article in which empirical evidence was revealed for the existence of gravitational waves 
conjectured 100 years ago by Einstein was written by 1000 authors. The 502nd co-author of 
this article was probably less involved in the overall design and organization of the research 
as the first few authors, but they were probably quite essential for the completion of this 
research. Research is increasingly also networked and collaborative by necessity. 
Edwards (Edwards et al. 2011) noted that researcher interest has favored a small fraction of 
human protein kinases of the total relevant human protein kinases in the search for new 
molecules that could contribute to combatting disease for many decades, reflecting major 
industry interests (research has concentrated on fewer than 50 of the 500 known kinases). 
Competitive science narrows societal relevance to set of possibilities with anticipated 
economically exploitable results. Hence, the productivity and reproducibility crises linked to a 
competitive closed form of science constitute an obstacle for responsible societally relevant 
outputs of science.  
Currently we are dependent on courageous initiatives such as those from Miedema et al at the 
Utrecht Medical Centre, who are running a pilot with an alternative reward and incentive 
system for research professors who must have their research assessed by a broad set of 
stakeholders, including patient organizations and industry (Miedema, 2018). 
Open research activities as conducted by the Structural Genomics Consortium (SGC), a non-
for-profit organization, widen the scope of societally relevant research. The SGC’s mission is 
to catalyze research in new areas of human biology and drug discovery by focusing explicitly 
on less well-studied areas of the human genome, ignored by industry. SGC’s mission 
statement reads2: 
‘The SGC accelerates research in these new areas by making all its research output 
available to the scientific community with no strings attached, and by creating an open 
collaborative network of scientists in hundreds of universities around the world and in 
nine global pharmaceutical companies’. 
Together, this network of academic and industry scientists is driving a new scientific and drug 
discovery ecosystem whose primary aim is to advance science and is less influenced by 
personal, institutional or commercial gain. 
The SGC collaborates within a global network of researchers who refrain from applying 
intellectual property rights in the research, discovery and exploration phase and who share 
data through open notebooks, thereby creating a creative commons. Intellectual property 
rights (IPR) still play a role in the commercial process of actual drug-development, but the 
refraining from IPR in the research, discovery and exploration phase avoids the inhibition of 
the innovation process. They have established a public-private partnership with 8 industries. 
The results are impressive: The SGC started in 2004 and outcomes to date include more than 
25 ongoing clinical trials, while significantly reducing the time lime of bringing molecules to 
clinical trials. 
Following the mission philosophy of the SGC, open, collaborative, networked research 
already provides a rationale for responsible, open innovation. First, one must realize that to 
yield the ‘right societal impacts’ of research, the quality of the scientific base must provide for 
it. Surely an ineffective science will have societal impacts, yet their societal quality and scope 
will be contestable. Opening research systems and facilitating pro-active data sharing (prior to 
publishing), open verification and review as well as the publication of unsexy products of 
science, such a ‘negative’ results, will improve the quality of the science base and therefore 
can provide a better direction to possible innovation outputs. Open, collaborative research 
systems will make science more efficient as we can share resources and avoid the unnecessary 
duplication of research work, and more reliable because of better collective verification. Open 
research systems and open scholarship will overcome the productivity crisis in science. The 
current system incentivizes scientists to become ever more productive by producing more 
publications. However, although engaging massively with competitive science, either in 
‘excellence’ driven research funding contexts or in competitive mandated research projects 
funded by industry, the scientific system as such becomes more unproductive. 
Open research and scholarship3. not only relates to the openness of ‘knowledge sources’, such 
as data or publications, but also to the openness (and responsiveness) of the knowledge actors 
towards each other: Open research implies the involvement of all relevant knowledge actors 
in co-production mode, far beyond the conventional academic realm and might include citizen 
scientists. 
 
Innovations are brought about by coalitions of academics, industrialists and societal actors, 
including an increasing body of citizen science. These knowledge coalitions will make it 
possible to direct and re-direct science to deliver on innovations that are societally beneficial. 
  
 
Figure 1: A full cycle of Open Research and Scholarship 
 





A full cycle of open research and scholarship starts with open research, set through the mutual 
openness of knowledge actors (towards each other) in defining the research agenda following 
the input of the issue-relevant open knowledge inputs These reflect the phases of the usual 
research cycle of research agenda setting and the corresponding process of research discovery 
and analysis. So, the left half of the cycle represent the open research and scholarship inputs, 
both in terms of knowledge actors and knowledge sources. 
The right half of the cycle represents Open Research and Scholarship outputs, both in terms of 
knowledge outputs (publication, data etc.) and actual outputs of coalitions of knowledge 
actors. These come about as the results and validated output from open review and 
assessment, equally resulting in effective knowledge coalitions collaborating in outreach and 
knowledge dissemination. Open knowledge sharing is an element present at all stages of the 
research process, from agenda setting to the dissemination of (validated) knowledge. 
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Open research and scholarship can be defined as: 
‘sharing knowledge and data as early as possible in the research process in open collaboration 
with all relevant knowledge actors’. 
Thus, the example of the rationale of doing open research as, for example, practiced by the 
SGC already resembles a model of responsible innovation without any apparent strong 
normative requirements embedded in formal research policies. However, it must be said that 
here the researchers themselves took the normative choice to address diseases ignored by 
industry and thereby took the perspective of responsible innovation, with an effort to deliver 
on societally desirable outputs while compensating (with a public-private partnership) for 
existing serious market-deficits.  
 
Interdependence of open research and open innovation 
The SGC example demonstrates the immediate interdependence of open research and open 
innovation. However, it is important here to understand the distinct features of the incremental 
steps required to go from credible research, to responsive research and responsible research in 
the research dimension and the distinct features of credible innovation, responsive innovation 
and responsible innovation. First, the creation of knowledge in science underlies distinct 
universalizable codes for ‘good’ research conduct, enabling a global research practice that is 
virtually independent of cultural and national constraints. As the previous director of the US 
National Science Foundation Subra Suresh put it: ‘Good science anywhere is good for science 
everywhere’. To find an equivalent for this statement for ‘innovation’ is an intellectually 
interesting endeavor, yet it will not yield a result with an equal level of universalizability as 
for the science dimension. One may propose: Good innovation anywhere, might be beneficial 
for many, somewhere. The latter reflects that innovation outcomes may be successful in 
particular cultures and nations while at the same time they may have a global reach as well. 
The somewhere is important here for the allocation of the impacts of research and innovation. 
It must create problems even for the classical advocates of innovation with a view on ‘jobs 
and growth’. Apple, arguably one of the most innovative companies of the last decade, did not 
create the ‘impacts’ where they were wanted. Steve Jobs famously replied to President 
Obama’s question what it would take to make iPhones in the United States? ‘Those jobs aren't 
coming back’ (Politico, 2012). Responsible innovation transcends and relativizes the 
‘somewhere’ since responsible innovation seeks to address societally desirable outcomes 
beyond national contexts. 
Second, the step-up processes show, respectively, the incremental steps with their criteria 
towards responsible research and responsible innovation. The criteria listed for each step are 
to be understood as additional criteria in comparison to the previous step: obviously 
responsible science presupposes credible and responsive science. 
 
  
Figure 2: Step-up process for ‘good’ open research with additional criteria for each step 
 




The sixth point of departure for a vision of responsible innovation concerns the call for 
rewarding and establishing open, collaborative research and scholarship practices. Open 
research and scholarship are a necessary but not sufficient condition for responsible 
innovation. Open research and scholarship already provide for better opportunities and a 
broader scope for societal relevance but does not yet meet all conditions to drive innovations 
towards societally desirable ends. For that, we must turn to a sixth deficit. 
 
Sixth Deficit: Lack of Foresight and Anticipative Governance for the alternative shaping 
of innovation in sectors. 
Although open research and scholarship provide for responsiveness towards societal demands 
and broadens the scope for actually addressing societal desirable options, it does not yet 
provide the sufficient conditions to steer research and innovations or to complete mission-
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professional bodies that would look into the type of outcomes we want to get out of research 
and innovation processes, and the establishment of governance mechanisms that would give 
some direction to the innovation process under the first section.  
To bring this forward, I believe the institutionalisation of foresight, public-private 
partnerships based on governance mechanisms such as codes of conduct, coupled with various 
mechanisms for impact assessment, should pave the way for a better governance of emerging 
technologies and make them productive in delivering on societally desirable outcomes. 
Foresight is necessary to facilitate the possibility to ‘shape’ technologies and provide for 
better governance. To illustrate this point, I turn to the example of precision agriculture. 
Precision agriculture makes use of a variety of monitoring -technologies, involving, among 
other things drones used for the mapping of weeds, alongside other GPS enabled technologies 
that monitor very local weather and soil conditions. Unmanned tractors equipped with sensors 
can provide information for specific crop management in terms of water and pesticide use. 
‘Texting’ cattle can provide information on their (health) condition. 
Precision Agriculture will further rationalise the agriculture and food system of the future as it 
promises to increase the capacity for coping with environmental pressures, to increase the 
quality of the agricultural outputs, all while reducing costs and to enhance food safety. The 
future of farming can follow quite different scenarios, depending on among other things 
which business models will prevail, the extent to which public authorities intervene and the 
socio-economic model driving farming businesses. A crucial factor will be the decision on 
whether the data gathered by precision agriculture techniques will be owned by big companies 
or remain publicly accessible or owned by the farmers.  
The implementation of Precision Agriculture can follow different scenarios. A scenario of 
large scale farming concentrating on the production of commodity crops such as soya and 
maize, enabled by unmanned farms, remotely monitored in the management offices of big 
agribusinesses, is as equally as possible as a scenario in which a variety of farm scales co-
exists with farmers who share the data among themselves and who jointly facilitate the direct 
sales of crops to local markets via online shops. 
The following table gives a sketch of the possibilities ranging between options for an 
approach enabling responsible innovation or a fully market-driven innovation approach 
guided without public interference. 
 
Table 1: The alternative shaping of precision agriculture technologies by a responsible 
innovation approach or a global-market driven approach respectively 
Factors for ‘shaping’ the 
technology 
‘Responsible Innovation’ Global-market driven 
innovation 
Stakeholder involvement Involving all producers/users Technology push by big 
agribusiness 




Overall-technology design Normative design with 
determining factors such as 
data ownership, scale of use, 
Fragmentary, sequential 
technology introduction 
whenever they become 
available 
privacy by design 
approaches etc. 
Access to resources Public authorities enabling 
access to resources including 
to small farmers 
Resource access inequalities 
remain unaddressed 
Data- access and ownership Data ownership with farmers Data ownership primarily 
with big agribusinesses 
Economic policy Aligned to socio-economic 
needs, business models 
based on sharing of data 
Business models based on 
centralised data systems in 
big agri-businesses, early 
technological fixes 
Governance Codes of Conduct, Public-
Private Partnerships  
Global markets driven 
 
A proper foresight exercise provides enormous insights in the diversity of options. Normally, 
these options escape the attention of the public, and to some extent, the attention of policy 
makers. The study ‘Precision agriculture and the future of farming in Europe, Scientific 
Foresight Study’ facilitated by the Scientific and Technological Options of the European 
Parliament (2016) was an interesting initiative whose aim was to anticipate the governance 
issues ahead of us at an early stage. 
This particular study provided an overview of plausible governance issues depending on 
which type of global socio-economic scenarios would prevail. The study also suggests a new 
forward-looking typography of what new farming business could be, including the following 
new professional profiles (page 34):  
The Geo-Engineer would specialise in carbon sequestration, alongside a food 
production business… 
The Energy Farmer would specialise in renewable energy production and management 
for the local area… 
The Web Farm Host would… give a constant, positive commentary to the outside 
world, explaining what is going on and often giving virtual tours to school children…  
The Animal Therapist would act as a welfare manager for farm animals …  making 
sure that consumers buying meat or dairy products from the farm are able to access 
information about animal wellbeing… 
The Pharmer would use biotechnology expertise to grow and harvest plants that have 
been genetically engineered with foreign DNA to make them produce medicine… 
The Insect Farmer would farm large quantities of insects for use as natural predators to 
control the new species of insect that spread in farming areas because of climate 
change 
This list shows the necessity for policy guidance and intervention as well as public 
deliberation. Only if this type of deliberation is executed will a meaningful democratic 
direction be imparted to the innovation process. Otherwise possible options will have 
disappeared over time, without anyone realizing that it had previously been an actual 
‘shaping’ option. Ideally, foresight practices need to be combined with impact assessments for 
the various future options and scenarios. It is important here to underline that those 
assessments should not ‘evaluate’ the technological option as such, but rather the socio-
economic impacts of the changes a ‘set of technologies’ such precision agriculture 
technologies will make to the system as a whole. In the case of precision agriculture, the 
impact assessments should therefore concentrate on the agri-food system as a whole. This 
makes the alignment with broad public values and expectations regarding the sector equally 
possible. Such impact assessments could thus include vision assessments including those from 
a wider public (See Grunwald, 2018 for excellent overview on Technology Assessment). 
There is an important role for the ethics of normative design of systems and technologies. 
Ethics has to move beyond an ethics of constraints (e.g. focussing on what should prohibited 
or limited) to an ethics of construction. Normative design in open interaction with users is 
already practiced in ICT and should now be extended to the sectors in which they will 
operate. Codes of conduct embraced by both public authorities and the private sector are also 
important. Codes of conduct have the advantage over legislative action since they can already 
be operational in a context where the technology is still in development and can equally steer 
its direction by facilitating proper self-regulation and enabling and assigning responsibilities 
to all stakeholders. 
To stay with the example of Precision Agriculture: In early 2018 a coalition of associations 
from the EU agri-food chain launched in early 2018 a joint EU Code of Conduct on 
agricultural data sharing. The Code promotes the benefits of sharing data and implies data-
ownership with farmers whenever they are at the origin for the generation of those data.4 
In a similar vein, the normative design of artificial intelligence technologies was discussed for 
the first time in the European Parliament in November 2018. The Atomium European Institute 
for Science, Media and Democracy initiated a discussion on ‘what is a good AI society’, 
proposing a framework in which artificial intelligence is constructed as a technology that can 
enable human self-realisation, enhance human agency, increase societal capabilities and 
cultivate societal cohesion (Atomium European Institute for Science Media and Democracy, 
2018). 
Meaningful foresight, normative design of technologies, and impact assessment can thus 
address the ‘right impacts’ or the positive outcomes of research and innovation. Market-
deficits can be identified and overcome with public investment and policy. Specific sector-
system (agriculture, energy, mobility etc) alignment with public values and expectations can 
be facilitated by foresight and public deliberation. Societally desirable outputs can take 
precedence over technological potential while open research and scholarship can provide for 
insight and options for societally desirable innovations. 
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Academy of Sciences issued a report embracing ‘open science’ in 2018: Open Science by Design, Realising a 
Vision for 21st Century Research, National Academy Press, 2018  




Atomium European Institute for Science Media and Democracy (2018), accessed 20/11/2018 
at http://www.eismd.eu/ai4people/ 
Baker, Dean, Arjun Jayadev and Joseph Stiglitz (2017), ‘Innovation, Intellectual Property 
Right and Innovation.  A better set of approaches for the 21st Century’, accessed 20/11/2018 
at http://ip-unit.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/IP-for-21st-Century-EN.pdf 
Bessen, James and Michael Meurer (2014), The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes. 99 Cornell 
L. Rev. 387 (2014) Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-
34. 
Bloom, Nicholas, Charles Jones, John Van Reenen and Micheal Web (2017), ‘Are ideas 
getting harder to find?’, accessed 20/11/2018 at https://web.stanford.edu/~chadj/IdeaPF.pdf 
Bollen, Johan (2018), Who would you share your funding with?, Nature, vol 560, 9 August 
2018 
Bountra, Chas; When Wha, Lee and Javier Lezaun (2017), A new pharmaceutical commons: 
Transforming Drug Discovery, Oxford Martin Policy Paper, Oxford Martin School 
Dosi, G. and J. E. Stiglitz (2014), The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Development Process, with Some Lessons from Developed Countries: An Introduction. In 
Intellectual Property Rights: Legal and Economic Challenges for Development, Mario 
Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, Keith E. Maskus, Ruth L. Okediji, Jerome H. Reichman, and Joseph 
E. Stiglitz (eds.), Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-53. 
Economist, Science goes Wrong, lead article, October 2013 
Edwards, Aled, Ruth Isserlin, Gary D Bader, Stephen V. Frye, Timothy M Willson, and Frank 
H Yu (2011), Too many roads not taken, Nature, vol 470, p 163-165 
Evers, Albert and Helga Nowotny (1987) Uber den Umgang mit Unsicherheit, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Commission of the European Communities (2001), European Governance: A White paper, 25 
January 2001 
Commission of the European Communities (2004) Communication from the commission to 
the council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: An action plan for Europe 2005-2009. Second 
Implementation Report 2007-2009, Brussels, 29.10.2009, COM (2009) 607 final (citation on 
page 10). 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2011), Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative 
Innovation Union, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic Committee, and the Committee of the Regions. SEC(2010) 1161 
 
European Commission (2015) Open Innovation, Open Science and Open to the World. 
Publication Office of the European Union, 2015. 
 
Fisher, Erik, Roop L. Mahajan and Carl Mitcham (2006). “Midstream Modulation of 
Technology: Governance from Within.” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 26(6): 
485- 496. 
 
Grunwald, Armin (2018). Technology Asssessment in Practice and Theory, Routledge 
Herbert, D. L. (2013) A. G. Barnett and N. Graves Nature 495, 314; 2013 
Holbrook, J. Britt. (2017). “Peer Review, Interdisciplinarity, and Serendipity” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Interdisciplinarity, 2nd edition. Robert Frodeman, Julie Thompson Klein, Roberto 
C. S. Pacheco, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 485-97. 
Karinen, Risto and David H Guston (2010) "Towards Anticipatory Governance. The 
Experience with Nanotechnology". In: Governing Future Technologies. Nanotechnology and 
the Rise of an Assessment Regime. Mario Kaiser (eds). Springer: Dordrecht, Heidelberg, 
London, New York, page 217ff. 
 
Lund Declaration (2009). Conference: New Worlds – New Solutions. Research and 
Innovation as a Basis for Developing Europe in a Global Context. Lund, Sweden, 7-8 July 




Miedema, Frank (2018). Setting the Agenda. Who are we answering to? Blog, BMJ Open 
Science, posted on 24 January 2018, accessed 20/11/2018 at 
https://blogs.bmj.com/openscience/2018/01/24/setting-the-agenda-who-are-we-answering-to/ 
Munafò, M. R., B.A. Nosek, D.V.M. Bishop, K.S. Button, C.D. Chambers, N. Percie du Sert 
and J.P.A. Ioannidis (2017). A manifesto for reproducible science. Nature Human Behaviour, 
1, 21. accessed 20/11/2018 at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-016-0021 
National Academies of Sciences (2018) Open Science by Design, Realizing a Vision for 
21stCentury Research, National Academy Press, 2018 
National Nanotechnology Initiative (2001), accessed 20/11/2018 at http://nano.gov/about-
nni/what/vision-goals 
Nature (2006), editorial lead of December 2006, doi:10.1038/nature05535 
 
Nielsen, Michael (2013), Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of Networked Science, 
Princeton University Press. 




Urgenda (2018), The Urgenda Climate Case against the Dutch Government, accessed 
20/11/2018 at https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case/ 
 
Stahl, Bernd Carsten (2011): "IT for a Better Future: How to Integrate Ethics, Politics and 
Innovation" In: Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society (9:3), Special 
Issue on Emerging Technology and Ethics, edited by Kutoma Wakunuma, 140-156 
 
Stilgoe, Jack (2014) Against Excellence, Guardian, 19 December 2014 
Scientific and Technological Options of the European Parliament (2016), Precision 




Ozolina, Zaneta, Carl Mitcham, Doris Schroeder, Emilio Mordini, Paul McCarthy and John 
Crowley (2012), Ethical and Regulatory Challenges to Science and Research Policy at the 
Global Level 
 
Owen, Richard, Jack Stilgoe, Phil MacNaghten(2013). A Framework for Responsible 
Innovation in: R. Owen, M. Heintz and J Bessant (eds.) Responsible Innovation. London: 
John Wiley 
 
Von Schomberg, Rene (2007), From the ethics of technology towards and ethics of 
knowledge policy. Working document of the Service of the European Commission. 




Von Schomberg, Rene (2013), "A vision of responsible innovation". In: R. Owen, M. Heintz 
and J. Bessant (eds.) Responsible Innovation. Managing the Responsible Emergence of 
Science and Innovation in Society. London: John Wiley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
